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The Emoji that Cost $20,000: Triggering Liability for 
Defamation on Social Media 
Nicole Pelletier

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Social media
1
 has taken the world by storm.
2
 As of 2016, over 
three billion people in the world are active Internet users,
3
 and over 
two billion are active on social media.
4
 Facebook reports 1.79 billion 
monthly active users worldwide,
5
 while another statistic reporting the 
number of active Facebook users says it is “still counting.”6 With 
lower but still influential numbers, Twitter reports 313 million 
monthly active users for 2016.
7
 In 2013, social media surpassed email 
 
  J.D. (2016), Washington University School of Law.  
 1. The phrase “social media” serves to describe interactive websites where users can post 
comments, photos, and other content to communicate virtually with other users. See Social 
Media Definition, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/ 
social_media (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (defining social media as, “[w]ebsites and applications 
that enable users to create and share content or to participate in social networking.”). The most 
common social media websites for users in the United States include Facebook, Twitter, Google 
Plus, and Instagram, but there are numerous others throughout the world. See Simon Kemp, 
Digital, Social & Mobile Worldwide in 2015, WE ARE SOCIAL (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://wearesocial.net/blog/201015/01/digital-social-mobile-worldwide-2015/ (citing global 
statistics on use and popularity of social media for Internet users).  
 2. See generally Andréa Ford, The Global Network: Facebook Has Conquered America. 
Can It Take Over the World?, TIME, at 59 (Dec. 2010), www.time.com/time/pdf/global_ 
network.pdf (mapping the number of active Facebook users in 2010 throughout the world). 
 3. Statistics and Facts of Internet Usage Worldwide, STATISTA, https://www.statista. 
com/topics/1145/internet-usage-worldwide/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“Currently, more than 
3.17 billion people worldwide access the internet.”).  
 4. Statistics and Facts About Social Networks, STATISTA (Oct. 2, 2016, 11:46 AM), 
https://www.statista.com/topics/1164/social-networks/ (reporting 2.34 billion social media users 
in 2016). 
 5. Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2016). 
 6. See Shea Bennett, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, Vine, Snapchat—Social 
Media Stats 2014, SOC. TIMES (June 9, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/ 
social-media-statistics-2014/499230.  
 7. See, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).  
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to become the number one Internet activity in the United States.
8
 
Most sources agree that social media use will continue to grow
9
 and 
that social media communication will continue reaching new heights 
globally.
10
 
The staggering number of social media users
11
 provides new ways 
for individuals to communicate. Twitter,
12
 for example, enables users 
to post statements called “tweets.”13 Tweets contain up to 140 
characters, and may be accompanied by photos, videos, and links.
14
 
Within the 140 characters, users may include Emoticons. An 
Emoticon, more commonly referred to as an emoji, is “[a] small 
digital image or icon used to express an idea, emotion, etc.[,]” in 
 
 8. Felix Richter, Social Networking is the No. 1 Online Activity in the U.S., STATISTA 
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.statista.com/topics/1164/social-networks/chart/1238/digital-media-
use-in-the-us/ (noting that the average U.S. resident spent thirty-seven minutes per day on social 
media in 2013).  
 9. See, e.g., Kemp, supra note 1 (noting the expansive growth of social media use and 
stating that such growth “shows no signs of slowing anytime soon”); Carlos Monteiro, 
Infographic: Who’s Really Using Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, Tumbler, and Instagram in 
2015, ADWEEK (Jan. 12, 2015, 12:02 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-
branding/new-social-stratosphere-who-using-facebook-twitter-pinterest-tumblr-and-instagram-
2015-and-beyond-1622 (predicting that the number of users of popular social media websites, 
including Twitter, will continue to increase and that the most drastic increase in users will come 
from the sixty-five and older demographic); Proctor, supra note 7.  
 10. This Note focuses on social media within the U.S. legal framework. The use and 
effect of social media, however, spans continents. See The World Factbook, CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/ 
2153rank.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) (listing the top three regions with the most populous 
Internet users as China, the European Union, and the United States, in that order); Company 
Info, supra note 5 (detailing Facebook headquarters’ report that “[a]pproximately 84.2% of our 
daily active users are outside the US and Canada.”). Even in countries where the government 
has banned certain social media websites, citizens remain active users. See Geelan Fahimy, 
Comment, Liable for Your Lies: Misrepresentation Law as a Mechanism for Regulating 
Behavior on Social Networking Sites, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 367, 386 n.111 (2012) (citing Ford, 
supra note 2) (observing that even though the Chinese government constantly blocks Facebook, 
nearly 100,000 people in the country actively use the site).  
 11. See generally Kemp, supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting the use and 
popularity of social media throughout the world). 
 12. See The Twitter Glossary, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/166337-the-
twitter-glossary (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (“Twitter [is] [a]n information network made up of 
140-character messages (including photos, videos and links) from all over the world.”). 
 13. The Twitter Glossary, supra note 12. The term “tweet” is also used in the Twitter 
community as a verb, meaning to upload a statement onto Twitter. The Twitter Glossary, supra 
note 12 (“Tweet (v.), The act of sending a Tweet.”). 
 14. The Twitter Glossary, supra note 12. 
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electronic communication.
15
 Emojis are often included alongside text 
to portray an emotion or otherwise add to readers’ understanding of 
the text.
16
 The most basic emoji is a yellow smiley face, but emojis 
span from face emotions, like happy, sad, and angry, to animals and 
ordinary objects, like a cat or a briefcase.
17
 With such options, tweets 
are largely only limited by individual users’ creativity.  
After a user posts a tweet, the tweet displays on the user’s 
personal timeline. More popular tweets may also end up on blogs and 
other websites.
18
 Twitter, like other social media websites, gives 
users the ability to post statements virtually, affording opportunities 
for disconnected communication
19
 and anonymity,
20
 along with the 
power to reach millions from a desktop at home.
21
  
The popularity of social media has given rise to new legal issues.
22
 
Social media provides users with a new medium for communication, 
 
 15. See Definition of Emoji in English, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/us/emoji (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
 16. See Lisette Mejia, 17 People Who Emoji Better Than You, POPSUGAR (June 28, 
2016), http://www.popsugar.com/tech/Funny-Emoji-Texts-35465201#photo-35465201 (showing 
instances where people used emojis to tell a story). Today, people use emjois not only on 
Twitter, but also in text messages, emails, other social media websites, and other electronic 
communication. Id. 
 17. See Emoji Keyboard Online, https://emojikeyboard.org/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) 
(illustrating available emojis).  
 18. The Twitter Glossary, supra note 12. 
 19. See, e.g., Brandon Copeland, Social Media: The Decline of Face-to-Face 
Communication, BRAND & MORTAR (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.brandandmortar.com/social-
media/social-media-killer-face-face-communication/ (arguing that social media has led to the 
decline of face-to-face communication and thus inhibited real relationships formed by 
expressing emotions); Brian Jung, The Negative Effect of Social Media on Society and 
Individuals, HOUS. CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/negative-effect-social-media-
society-individuals-27617.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (claiming that one of the negative 
effects of social media is “a [f]alse [s]ense of [c]onnection”). But see, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, 
Technology Has Made Life Different, but Not Necessarily More Stressful, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/upshot/technology-has-made-life-different-but-not-
necessarily-more-stressful.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 (noting studies that show social media 
reduces stress, and arguing that communication through technology leads to closer 
relationships).  
 20. See Jung, supra note 19 (“The anonymity afforded online can bring out dark impulses 
that might otherwise be suppressed.”). 
 21. Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and Its Remedies Look Like in the 
Age of Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 430, 433 (2013) (commenting that Twitter allows any 
individual to become a publisher and entertain a global audience). 
 22. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Draker v. 
Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex. App. 2008). The rise of social media and other 
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and often an innovative platform on which to impose harm.
23
 This 
reality has created new factors to consider in otherwise traditional 
cases.
24
 With few statutes to mitigate these harms,
25
 courts are forced 
to adapt existing law.
26
 Even with recent developments in the 
judiciary, courts are often left playing catch-up.
27
 
This context also exposes over two billion individuals to liability 
based on social media use.
28
 The few statutes in place largely serve to 
immunize social media websites, leaving individual users 
unprotected.
29
 The two billion social media users must be made 
aware of potential liability arising out of social media use, and 
further, they must be informed on how to avoid it. 
This Note provides background and proposes a solution for 
individual user liability on social media. First, the Note addresses the 
 
technological innovations also affect how the legal profession operates. For instance, social 
media affects how judges manage cases and their courtrooms. This reality is evident with Judge 
Herbert B. Dixon’s article outlining basic instructions to judges on how to operate an iPad. It 
specifically includes a section on emojis, titled, “Does My iPad Have ‘Smileys’?” The section 
reads:  
Yes, if you are the type of person who inserts smileys into e-mails and other 
documents, you are in luck. They are called ‘Emoji characters’ and they’re found on 
the built-in Emoji keyboard, which may take some effort to find. Look for a globe 
symbol next to the .?123 key . . . press and hold the globe symbol, and select Emoji. 
Instantly you will have a host of smileys and other figures at your disposal.  
J. Herbert B. Dixon Jr., iPad Wizardry for Beginners, 52 JUDGES’ J. 36, 38 (2013). 
 23. See generally Angelotti, supra note 21 (arguing that Twitter’s platform provides users 
with the ability to easily publish defamatory statements). See also infra notes 32–35. 
 24. Angelotti, supra note 21 (listing new questions courts must address in Twitter 
defamation cases). 
 25. Federal legislation affecting social media offenses include the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030 (2012) [hereinafter the CFAA]; and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). For state laws, see infra note 39.  
 26. See, e.g., AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496 (W.D. Va. 2013). 
 27. The rise of social media has introduced legal claims arising from social media into the 
courts. Social media defamation claims have become such a large portion of legal disputes that 
scholars have developed new vocabulary to denote the rise and continued influence of such 
offenses. See, e.g., Angelotti, supra note 21 (utilizing the term “Twibel” to denote libel claims 
arising from tweets posted on Twitter).  
 28. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.  
 29. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (immunizing Internet service providers for 
publishing user content); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (criminalizing users for computer-related 
fraud; placing no responsibility on Internet service or content providers); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 
(2012) (authorizing Internet providers to intercept electronic communications in certain 
circumstances; criminalizing users for intercepting electronic communications). 
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history of social media law in the U.S. legal system, specifically 
defamation claims and legislative acts to immunize social media 
websites. Next, it discusses a British court’s finding of liability based 
on an emoji that was contained in a tweet and analyzes whether an 
emoji could trigger liability in the United States. Then, the Note 
juxtaposes the potential for individual user liability based on an emoji 
with the immunization granted to social media websites. To 
conclude, the Note proposes new federal legislation that will place 
responsibility on social websites to notify users of potential liability 
arising from social media use. The purpose of this Note is to lay out 
proactive steps the U.S. legal system must take to protect individual 
social media users and allow for the continued advancement of 
Internet communication services.  
II. HISTORY 
A number of civil and criminal offenses can occur on social 
media.
30
 As no common law exists for social media offenses, U.S. 
courts have applied doctrines from other areas of the law to remedy 
these twenty-first century harms.
31
 Courts have recognized 
 
 30. Some argue that the mere existence of social media is harmful to society. See Dianna 
Booher, 6 Ways Social Media Is Doing More Harm Than Good, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 
2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dianna-booher/social-media_b_5375853. 
html. 
 31. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-mail 
Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5th 169 (2000) (“The courts and legislatures have employed traditional 
defamation principles to regulate electronic and online defamation.”). The evolution of social 
media defamation claims parallels the development of privacy law beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, where privacy law developed out of then-existing tort law. The legal field 
first recognized a need for privacy law with the advancement of technology, specifically yellow 
journalism and penny presses. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 28 (3d 
ed., Wolters Kluwer Law & Business) (2011). Prominent scholars argue that these four 
categories of privacy are too narrow, and thus the judiciary’s acceptance of them has stunted 
privacy law and remedial measures. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s 
Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887 (2010).  
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defamation,
32
 misappropriation of identity,
33
 catfishing,
34
 
cyberbullying,
35
 cyberharassment,
36
 and revenge pornography
37
 as 
 
 32. See Defamation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining defamation as 
“[a] false written or oral statement that damages another’s reputation”). Defamation on social 
media occurs when users post libel or slander, negligently or with actual malice, that damages 
another individual’s reputation. See generally Jeffrey Elkin, Cybersmears: Dealing with 
Defamation on the Net, 9 BUS. L. TODAY 22 (2000) (detailing the evolution and prevalence of 
online defamation). 
 33. Misappropriation of identity is a primary concern on social media. It occurs either 
when users create false profiles, claiming to be another individual, or when users hack into 
existing profiles. Maksim Reznik, Identity Theft on Social Networking Sites: Developing Issues 
of Internet Impersonation, 29 TUORO. L. REV. 455, 465–66, 479 (2013). In severe cases, the 
fake user will publish lewd, humiliating, or otherwise personal remarks on the website, 
purporting to be the individual the account identifies. See Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 
320 (Tex. App. 2008) (noting that students created a fake social media account of their vice 
principal including “her name, photo, and place of employment, as well as explicit and graphic 
sexual references.”). Notably, misappropriation of identity over social media is not the same as 
identity theft in the context of fraud; the difference has created problems identifying appropriate 
remedies for identity theft in the social media context. See id. at 321 (finding no remedy for 
misappropriation of identity on social media); see also United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the CFAA does not apply to identity theft in the social media 
context and leaving the plaintiff without remedy). 
 34. Most commonly, catfishing refers to one Internet user purposely engaging an 
unknowing and vulnerable victim into a fake online relationship. See Aisha Harris, Who Coined 
the Term “Catfish,” SLATE (Jan. 18, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/ 
2013/01/18/catfish_meaning_and_definition_term_for_online_hoaxes_has_a_surprisingly.html. 
Catfishing may occur out of boredom or loneliness; however, in more drastic cases, catfishing 
occurs with intent to humiliate the victim or seek revenge. Id.; see also Molly McHugh, It’s 
Catfishing Season! How to Tell Lovers from Liars Online, and More, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 
23, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/its-catfishing-season-how-to-tell-
lovers-from-liars-online-and-more/ (explaining different forms of catfishing and suggesting 
ways to avoid being catfished online). 
 35. See What is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/ 
cyberbullying/what-is-it/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). Cyberbulling is “bullying that takes place 
using electronic technology.” Id. It typically affects teenagers. Cyberbullying Facts 
Summarizing What is Currently Known, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR., http://cyberbullying.us/ 
facts/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (reporting that nearly 16 percent of high school students have 
been victims of cyberbullying). In late 2014, cyberbullying made headlines when Monica 
Lewinsky spoke publicly against the negative effects of cyberbullying. See Dan Merica, 
Lewinsky Makes Emotional Plea to End Cyberbullying, CNN (Oct. 21, 2014, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/20/politics/lewinsky-cyber-bullying/ (capturing Lewinsky’s claim 
that in 1995 she became “patient zero” of cyberbullying as Internet users lashed out against her 
because of her reported affair with then President Bill Clinton). 
 36. Cyberharrassment is similar to cyberbullying, but the term cyberharassment is 
typically used to define online harassment perpetrated by an adult. See Internet Safety for Kids: 
Cyberbullying and Cyberharassment, GCF GLOBAL, http://www.gcflearnfree.org/internetsafety 
forkids/cyberbullying-and-cyberharassment/1/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). Cyberharassment is 
the repetitive abuse of another online. Katharine Quarmby, How the Law Is Standing Up to 
Cyberstalking, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014, 6:08 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/ 
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harms that occur on social media. Revenge porn is often viewed as 
the most severe action,
38
 and some states have tried it as a criminal 
offense.
39
 In addition to severity, these harms reach internationally,
40
 
and they most disproportionately affect members of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups, especially women.
41
  
 
08/22/how-law-standing-cyberstalking-264251.html. A subset of cyberharassment is 
cyberstalking. Id. Cyberstalking, often—and perhaps more appropriately—referred to as 
“psychological terrorism,” occurs when individuals use social media to annoy, harass, and/or 
threaten an innocent victim. Id. Scholars have identified three areas of cyberstalking: (1) direct 
communication; (2) indirect communication, circulated or posted online; and 
(3) misrepresentation online. Id. 
 37. Revenge pornography is the act of posting sexually explicit photos, videos, or other 
material of an individual onto social media without his or her permission, even if the material 
was originally captured with the individual’s consent. Adrienne N. Kitchen, Note, The Need to 
Criminalize Revenge Porn: How a Law Protecting Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul of the 
First Amendment, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247 (2015). Most commonly, revenge pornography 
occurs when a spurned lover seeks revenge by publishing intimate photos of their former lover 
online.  Id. Social media websites dedicated to revenge porn exist, and they provide a platform 
for users to upload photos of nude individuals without consent. Id. In the most severe cases, the 
user will upload the name and contact information of the victim with the photograph. Id. End 
revenge porn advocates call the offense “non-consensual pornography” or “cyber rape.” See, 
e.g., About, END REVENGE PORN, http://www.endrevengeporn.org/welcome/ (last visited Feb. 
8, 2015). 
 38. Revenge porn is seemingly more severe because it involves a lack of consent and 
implicates a global audience of offenders. In 2014, when hacker(s) found sexually explicit 
photographs of celebrity Jennifer Lawrence and published them online, Lawrence stated that the 
act itself was “a sex crime . . . a sexual violation.” Jennifer Lawrence: Photo Hacking was ‘Sex 
Crime’, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014, 1:51 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/ 
entertainment/people/2014/10/07/jennifer-lawrence-photo-hacking-sex-crime/16862365/ (quoting 
Lawrence). She then placed rightful responsibility on individuals other than the hacker(s), 
declaring: “Anybody who looked at those pictures, you’re perpetuating a sexual offense. You 
should cower with shame.” Id. 
 39. Although case law developed around social media has relied on tort law to bring 
claims against individual users and Internet service providers, recent scholarship advocates for 
the criminalization of some social media offenses. See, e.g., Kitchen, supra note 37; Reznik, 
supra note 33; Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014) (founding their argument on the egregious nature of the act, 
the fundamental violation of privacy, and the need for deterrence). Courts are at the center of 
these debates and have taken different approaches in determining which offenses on social 
media amount to crimes. Compare United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (declining to determine whether misappropriation of identity amounts to a criminal 
offense under the CFAA), with United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the defendant’s criminal sentence pursuant to the CFAA for identity 
misappropriation). 
 40. See Quarmby, supra note 36 (detailing a case where the victim, living in the United 
States, experienced cyberharassment from an individual living in Singapore). 
 41. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 BOS. UNIV. L. REV. 61, 65 (2009) 
(illustrating that online harms “overwhelmingly target members of traditionally subordinated 
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A. Evolution of Defamation Claims in the United States 
A common legal claim arising from social media is defamation. 
Defamation is the publication of a false statement concerning an 
individual that negatively affects his or her reputation.
42
 To establish 
a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove the 
following elements: (1) publication; (2) the statement concerns the 
plaintiff; (3) falsity; (4) the requisite degree of fault; and 
(5) damage.
43
 The fourth element—requisite degree of fault—
depends on the plaintiff’s status or the matter of the statement.44 In 
most states, ordinary individuals need only show the publisher acted 
negligently in publishing the statement,
45
 while public figures, or 
ordinary individuals if the statement is a matter of public concern, 
must prove the publisher published the statement with “actual 
malice.”46 Such standards have evolved within the confines of the 
 
groups, particularly women.”). See also Cyberbullying Facts Summarizing What is Currently 
Known, supra note 35 (reporting that women are more likely to be victims of cyberbullying 
than men). But cf. Scott Stroud, The Dark Side of the Online Self: A Pragmatist Critique of the 
Growing Plague of Revenge Porn, 29 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 168 (2014) (questioning the 
statistics relied on by criminalization-of-revenge-porn advocates and suggesting that more men 
are victims of revenge porn and that women are more likely than men to engage in revenge 
porn, but not diminishing the negative effects of revenge porn regardless of gender). See also 
Scott H. Greenfield, #RevengePorn: Real Numbers Show It’s Not Really a Gender Issue, 
SIMPLE JUST.: CRIM. DEF. BLOG (July 29, 2014), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2014/07/29/ 
revengeporn-real-numbers-show-its-not-really-a-gender-issue/ (supporting Stroud’s claims). 
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 43. Id.  
 44. See infra notes 45–47. 
 45. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). There are situations, however, 
where a private figure’s defamation claim may require a showing of actual malice. For 
example, if the statement is on a matter of public concern, the plaintiff must prove actual 
malice. Id. at 344. Also, if the plaintiff is in the public arena regarding a certain public 
controversy or topic, he or she must prove actual malice. Id at 345. 
 46. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). The “actual malice” standard 
requires the plaintiff prove that the defendant published the alleged defamatory statement “with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. In New 
York Times, the Supreme Court held that allegedly defamatory statements about public officials 
must be published with actual malice to impose liability. Id. Three years later, the Court 
extended the actual malice standard to public figures. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130 (1967) (holding that public figures must prove the defendant published the allegedly 
defamatory statement with actual malice to recover damages). These high standards make it 
difficult for plaintiffs who are public figures or officials to prevail on defamation claims. The 
biggest hurdle to overcome is proving that the defendant possessed knowledge or should have 
possessed knowledge that the statement was false. See, e.g., id. (finding that the plaintiff, a 
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First Amendment,
47
 largely established in contrast to the right to free 
speech.
48
  
The judiciary has adapted these traditional elements of defamation 
to remedy defamatory statements posted on social media.
49
 Most 
courts have readily found that statements posted on social media 
satisfy the publication element of defamation.
50
 Similarly, courts 
apply the same analysis for the requisite degree of fault when 
determining whether the plaintiff must prove negligence or actual 
malice.
51
 Courts have, however, been presented with nuanced issues 
while attempting to adapt existing law to social media 
communications. The judiciary has had to determine: (1) whether 
statements published on social media may be factual; (2) who is 
liable as the publisher; and (3) which new technological characters, 
such as emojis, may trigger liability.
52
  
B. Determining Whether Statements Published on Social Media are 
Factual 
The first element of defamation that presents an issue in social 
media defamation cases is falsity. In ordinary defamation case, the 
plaintiff must prove “falsity.” In other words, they must show that the 
allegedly defamatory statement is a fact, not an opinion.
53
 In 
 
public figure, was not able to recover damages for defamation, even though the defendant 
published a false statement). 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 48. See Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 130 (finding that the First Amendment barred the 
plaintiff’s defamation claim). 
 49. See Walsh v. Latham, No. SCV 251041, 2014 WL 618995, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) 
(“[C]ommunication via the Internet does not justify the application of a different defamation 
standard.”). See generally Elkin, supra note 32, at 24 (“The courts have held that the laws of 
defamation undoubtedly apply to false statements made over the Internet.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“AOL falls 
squarely within this traditional definition of a publisher.”); GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, 
162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that a tweet satisfies the publication 
element of defamation). 
 51. See Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1289–93 (2014) (applying New 
York Times and Gertz to determine whether the plaintiff, who was defamed on social media, 
must prove negligence or actual malice). 
 52. See infra notes 51–138. 
 53. Matthew E. Kelley & Steven D. Zansberg, In This Issue, Cover Story a Little Birdie 
Told Me, “You’re a Crook”: Libel in the Twittersphere and Beyond, 30 COMM. LAW. 1, 35 
(Mar. 2014). The determination between opinion and fact must be made to satisfy the element 
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Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court established a 
two-prong test to determine falsity.
54
 The Court held that to satisfy 
this element of defamation, the statement must (1) be “provable as 
false[,]”55 and (2) “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual 
facts . . . .”56 
In the context of social media, the second prong of the Milkovich 
test forces courts to consider how a reasonable user would interpret 
an allegedly defamatory statement. Different approaches exist, but 
the majority of jurisdictions view the totality of the circumstances, 
considering factors such as the context of the statement and the 
medium through which it was published.
57
 For example, in 
determining whether a tweet can be reasonably interpreted as a fact, 
most courts consider the statement itself and whether the purpose of 
tweeting was to vent, joke, or relay facts.
58
  
Although courts typically view social media websites as platforms 
for casual communication and not factual statements,
59
 a recent case 
illustrates the potential reach of individual liability arising from 
social media. In AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc.,
60
 a federal 
district court found a user liable for posting a tweet on Twitter that 
defamed a competing business’ reputation.61 In AvePoint, the 
defendant tweeted: “U know things are bad when the Evil Avenue's 
customers are dumping out of 3 year deals in year 2 to buy Axceler's 
 
of falsity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). If a statement is an 
opinion, it cannot be proven false, and thus cannot satisfy the elements of defamation. Kelley & 
Zansberg, supra note 53. 
 54. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 55. Id. at 19. 
 56. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); accord Milkovich 497 U.S. at 
20. 
 57. See Patterson v. Grant-Herms, 2013 WL 5568427, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2013) 
(considering the “entire circumstances” to find that the statements the defendant posted to 
Facebook and Twitter were opinions, even though the defendant “chose not to include the entire 
circumstances in her communications”). See generally Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53, at 36 
(explaining that courts consider social media communications “in their entire context”).  
 58. See generally Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53, at 36 (outlining the judiciary’s 
approach to interpreting tweets and the publishers’ intent). 
 59. See id. (“Judges in the cases for which opinions are available have more often than not 
held that allegedly defamatory tweets are expressions of opinion or otherwise not actionable.”). 
 60. AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496 (W.D. Va. 2013). 
 61. Id. at 521. 
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ControlPoint!”62 The court, with little analysis, found that this tweet 
was a factual statement because it could be proven true or false.
63
 
Additionally, the court in AvePoint found that hashtags
64
 
contained within another tweet the defendant authored constituted an 
implied fact, and thus imposed liability.
65
 The second tweet the 
defendant wrote commented negatively on the plaintiff’s services and 
included the hashtag “#MadeinCHINA.”66 The court held that a 
reasonable Twitter user would interpret the tweet as an implied fact 
that the plaintiff’s products were made in China.67 The plaintiff, a 
United States military contractor, argued that with the hashtags, the 
tweet defamed their reputation, and the court found the defendant 
liable for defamation.
68
 
C. Determining Who is Liable as the Publisher: Immunity for Social 
Media Websites 
In addition to determining falsity, another nuanced issue social 
media defamation cases present is who published the statement, and 
thus, who is ultimately liable.
69
 Early cases concerning Internet 
defamation revolved around whether to hold liable individual users 
who posted the statement or Internet service providers that provided 
the medium through which defamatory statements were published.
70
 
 
 62. Id. at 508 (quoting Amended Complaint Exhibit D, AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, 
Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496 (W.D. Va. May 9, 2013) (No. 7:13-cv-00035-GEC)). 
 63. Id. at 508–09 (“The court must also reject the defendant’s argument that [Defendant’s] 
Twitter post offered only an opinion. [Defendant’s] statement . . . does not necessarily depend 
on his own point of view. Instead, the statement contains a factual assertion that is capable of 
being proven true or false.”). Cf. Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) (finding 
that a tweet uploaded onto Twitter which stated the plaintiff was “fucking crazy” was an 
opinion and therefore the tweet was not defamatory). 
 64. The Twitter Glossary, supra note 12 (“A hashtag is any word or phrase immediately 
preceded by the # symbol. When you click on a hashtag, you’ll see other Tweets containing the 
same keyword or topic.”). 
 65. AvePoint, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 507. 
 66. Id. at 520. The full tweet read: “@Axceler #ControlPoint #MADEINTHEUSA, The 
#SharePoint #RedDragon is #MADEINCHINA Long live #ControlPoint !!!! #ArmyStrong 
#AUSA2012.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 507–08. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Elkin, supra note 32, at 24. 
 70. Id. 
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With the rise of social media, the legislature quickly adopted 
protections for Internet service providers, such as the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA)
71
 and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA),
72
 leaving individual users unprotected. 
Since the enactment of the CDA,
73
 Internet service providers 
(termed “interactive computer service[s]” in the CDA) are protected 
from liability for defamatory statements written by third parties.
74
 
Internet service providers are companies that provide services for 
Internet access, use, or participation.
75
 Common Internet service 
providers in the United States include AT&T, Comcast, and 
Charter.
76
 The CDA views these companies as hosts or intermediaries 
that merely provide access for individuals to use the Internet.
77
  
The CDA distinguishes these Internet service providers from 
Internet content providers.
78
 Internet content providers are websites 
that take part in publishing information online.
79
 Common Internet 
content providers in the United States include Google, Yahoo, and 
Facebook—and most other social media websites.80 In theory, 
content providers may be held liable under the CDA if they publish 
the statement, defined by the CDA as being “responsible, in whole or 
 
 71. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 73. 47 U.S.C. § 230. See generally Hope Eckert, Note, The First Amendment in 
Cyberspace: No Place for Analogies, 1 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2 (2001) (recognizing that 
the government was largely motivated by the “Great Cyberporn Panic” in drafting and passing 
the CDA and other early Internet regulations). 
 74. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”); see id. § 203(f)(2) (defining “‘interactive computer service’ [as] any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or 
educational institutions.”). 
 75. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
 76. Sig Ueland, 20 Top Internet Service Providers, PRACT. ECOMMERCE (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/3225-20-Top-Internet-Service-Providers.  
 77. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
 78. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining “‘internet content provider’ [as] any person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”). 
 79. Id. § 230(f)(3). 
 80. Internet Publishing, Broadcasting & Search Portals Report Summary, HOOVERS, 
http://www.hoovers.com/industry-facts.internet-publishing-broadcasting-search-portals.1904. 
html (last visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
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in part, for the creation or development” of the allegedly defamatory 
statement.
81
 
Despite the plain language of the CDA, courts have adopted 
various tests under the CDA that largely serve to immunize social 
media websites.
82
 For example, some courts consider whether the 
Internet content provider passively publishes third party content. 
Under this approach, if the social media website is in any way 
passive, it cannot be held liable.
83
 Also, courts focus on the term 
“development” as provided in the CDA definition of an Internet 
content provider. These courts find that if a third party user creates 
and posts the statement, then the social media website did not 
develop it—and therefore, is not liable.84 Many courts also justify 
granting broad immunity based on the purposes set forth in the CDA, 
arguing that to promote Internet development, social media websites 
must be protected.
85
 With such interpretations, victims of social 
media defamation face scrupulously high standards in actions against 
social media websites, often leaving them without recourse.
86
  
 
 81. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
 82. See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The 
majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to 
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a 
third-party user of the service.’”) (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 83. Fair Hous. v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding an 
Internet content provider liable because it required users to publish certain information to their 
profiles and thus was not passive in publishing content to its website). 
 84. See. e.g., id. at 1167–68 (finding that an Internet content provider did not “develop” 
the statement when it edited user-created content); F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1197–97 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o be responsible for the development of offensive content, one 
must be more than a neutral conduit for that content.”). 
 85. “Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a 
minimum.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (considering the purpose behind the CDA in granting 
immunity to Internet service providers). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (stating that the policy 
behind the CDA is “to promote the continued development of the Internet . . . [and] to preserve 
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”). 
 86. See, e.g., Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 
(holding that a website that hosted online reviews was entitled to immunity under the CDA, 
reasoning that “classifying user characteristics into discrete categories and collecting responses 
to specific essay questions does not transform an interactive computer service into a developer 
of the underlying misinformation.”); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 
F.3d 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding the Internet service provider immune under Section 230 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
240 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 52:227 
 
 
A Fourth Circuit case of first impression illustrates the broad 
immunity granted to social media websites under the CDA. In Jones 
v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC,
87
 Jones, a high 
school teacher and cheerleader for a professional football team, 
brought state defamation claims against Nik Lamas-Richie in his 
capacity as manager of www.TheDirty.com, an online, user-
generated tabloid.
88
 The website enables users to upload comments, 
then Richie or a member of his staff selects which comments to 
publish to the site.
89
 Before publishing, Richie edits the comment and 
often adds his own editorial comment, designating any such addition 
with the electronic signature “—nik[.]”90 
Jones fell victim to Richie’s website when users began posting 
photos of her with men and commenting on her attractiveness and 
past relationships.
91
 While editing and selecting comments to publish 
to the website, Richie added his own commentary to each.
92
 One of 
his comments read, “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the 
sack?[—]nik[.]”93  
After Jones’ repeated requests to Richie to remove his and users’ 
harassing comments
94
 and Richie’s subsequent refusals, Jones filed 
suit. She alleged defamation, arguing that Richie and Dirty World 
were liable as publishers because Richie participated in selecting 
which posts to publish, encouraged the posts, and added his own 
comments to the published statements.
95
 The court disagreed. It held 
 
of the CDA because it was not involved in creating the defamatory part of the statement, as the 
provider did not sufficiently contribute to the content); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332 (finding that 
AOL was a publisher, but granting immunity pursuant to the CDA because AOL is an Internet 
service provider). But cf., Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1175 (holding a housing locator site not 
immune under the CDA because the site required users to publish certain information to their 
profiles). 
 87. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014).  
 88. Id. at 401–02. 
 89. Id. at 403. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 403–05. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 404. Other commentary by Richie included: “why go after one ugly cheerleader 
when you can go after all the brown baggers[]” and “[f]or a second yesterday I was jealous of 
those high school kids for having a cheerleader teacher, but not anymore.—nik” Id. 
 94. Id. (explaining that Jones sent over twenty-seven emails to Richie and even had her 
father personally contact Richie before she sought legal counsel). 
 95. Id. at 402. 
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that Richie’s participation did not cause the website to reach the level 
of an Internet content provider.
96
 The court found that Richie and 
Dirty World were Internet service providers under the CDA and 
could not be held liable.
97
  
Such broad immunization comes with its costs and benefits. 
Proponents of the legislation claim the CDA is “one of the most 
valuable tools for protecting freedom of expression and innovation on 
the [I]nternet . . . .”98 One Internet service provider even lists the 
statute on its website, citing the CDA as the reason it has never lost a 
defamatory action brought against it.
99
 Legal scholars, however, have 
critiqued case law’s interpretation of the CDA, arguing it grants 
immunity too broadly.
100
 The Eastern District of Virginia recently 
supported this view when it reluctantly dismissed a defamation claim 
against a social media website.
101
 In the opinion, the court warned of 
the negative repercussions caused by broad interpretations of the 
 
 96. Jones, 755 F.3d at 409–11 (explaining that the term “development” in the CDA’s 
definition of Internet content providers is narrowly confined); see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) 
(defining Internet content provider as a website that is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of [the] information . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 97. Jones, 755 F.3d at 410 (noting there are “limited circumstances under which exercises 
of [traditional publisher] functions are not protected[]” under the CDA).  
 98. CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
 99. Complaint Review: Want to Sue Ripoff Report? Want to Sue ED Magedson Founder 
of Rip-off [sic] Report?, RIPOFF REP. (Jan. 16, 2011), http://www.ripoffreport.com/r/want-to-sue-
ripoff-report-want-to-sue-ed-magedson-founder-of-rip-off-report/tempe-arizona-85280/ want-to-
sue-ripoff-report-want-to-sue-ed-magedson-founder-of-rip-off-report-can-i-get-fa-244724 (“If you 
are considering suing Ripoff Report because of a report which you claim is defamatory, you 
should be aware that to date, Ripoff Report has never lost such a case. This is because of a 
federal law called the Communications Decency Act or ‘CDA,’ 47 U.S.C. 230.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Barry J. Waldman, A Unified Approach to Cyber-Libel: Defamation on the 
Internet, a Suggested Approach, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 51 (1999) (“In defining the protections 
afforded by the CDA, the courts have nearly foreclosed the possibility of recovery for Cyber-
Libel.”); Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 is 
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet Service 
Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (2007) (arguing that the CDA is outdated and 
unfair and advocating that Internet service providers be held liable for defamatory statements 
over which they had sufficient control). 
 101. Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Supermedia, LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 446 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
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CDA.
102
 It granted the website immunity, however, because “under 
the CDA the [c]ourt’s hands are tied.”103 
Notably, broad immunity for social media websites also exists for 
identity theft on social media. Paralleling the CDA for defamation 
claims, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
104
 fails to hold 
social media websites responsible for misappropriation of identify 
claims.
105
 Unlike the CDA, however, the CFAA does not expressly 
grant immunity to Internet providers. Instead, the CFAA focuses on 
individual users, criminalizing computer-related fraud.
106
  
The CFAA has created its own universe of critiques.
107
 In part 
because it was enacted before the Internet existed,
108
 the CFAA is 
overbroad
109
 and overly narrow.
110
 For example, a Harvard fellow 
was prosecuted under the CFAA for downloading JSTOR articles to 
share publicly,
111
 yet an adult bully was exonerated after coxing a 
pregnant teenage girl into committing suicide.
112
 For 
 
 102. Id. at 453 (“The prospect of blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute 
defamatory statements could have widespread and potentially catastrophic consequences for 
individuals and entities alike.”). 
 103. Id.  
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Summary of Aaron’s Law, https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id= 
2CF5A4DC-D36D-4F19-B97A-8D79E856F895&download=1 (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) 
(“The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a sweeping anti-hacking law that criminalizes 
many forms of common Internet use and allows breathtaking levels of prosecutorial discretion 
that invites serious overuse and abuse.”); Justin Peters, Congress Has a Chance to Fix Its Bad 
“Internet Crime” Law, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
technology/technology/2015/04/aaron_s_law_why_it_s_needed_to_fix_the_horrendously_bad_
cfaa.html. 
 108. Peters, supra note 107 (mocking how when Congress enacted the CFAA, “‘computer 
crime’ was as problematic as ‘moon crime,’ in that both primarily existed in the realm of 
fiction.”). 
 109. Summary of Aaron’s Law, supra note 107 (explaining that the vagueness of the CFAA 
can lead to prosecution for “lying about one’s age on Facebook, one’s looks on Craigslist, or 
letting one’s friend log into their Pandora account . . . .”).  
 110. See infra note 112. 
 111. See Ruth Reader, 3 Years After Aaron Swartz’s Death, Here’s What’s Happened to 
Aaron’s Law, TECH.MIC (Jan. 11, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/132299/3-years-after-aaron-
swartz-s-death-here-s-what-s-happened-to-aaron-s-law#.ocaJ39ehZ. 
 112. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). In United States v. Drew, 
Drew, a middle-aged woman, misappropriated the identity of a high school boy to engage in a 
fake romantic relationship with a high school girl, initiate a breakup, and cause the victim 
severe emotional harm. Id. Drew’s actions, which included telling the girl through the fake 
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misappropriation of identity, no federal cause of action exists
113
 to 
hold individual users who steal identities on social media liable.
114
 
Again, victims of these social media offenses are left without any 
remedy.
115
 
Despite such immunity granted by legislation, social media 
websites may still be involved in litigation through subpoenas. 
Plaintiffs often seek assistance of social media websites in providing 
 
boy’s profile that “the world would be a better place without her in it[,]” culminated with the 
suicide of the adolescent girl. Id. at 452. The United States prosecuted Drew, claiming Drew’s 
violation of the social media website’s terms of service—which prohibited harassment, fake 
profiles, and offensive comments—constituted a crime under the CFAA. Id. at 451. A 
California jury found Drew guilty, but the judge vacated the verdict, relying on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to hold that the CFAA could not sustain Drew’s conviction. Id. at 463–64. 
Interestingly, although Drew and her victim were residents of O’Fallon, Missouri, the State of 
Missouri refused to press charges; the State of California intervened to file charges against 
Drew for violations of the CFAA. Gordon Gibb, Internet Fraud of the Worst Kind: Cyber 
Bullying, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Dec. 1, 2008, 7:15 AM), http://www.lawyersand 
settlements.com/features/internet-technology/internet-fraud-cyberfraud-cyberbullying.html#. 
VNiA-WR4qSM. 
 113. While the Federal Government fails to hold social media websites responsible for 
online offenses, some state legislatures are taking action. New York, Texas, and California have 
enacted laws criminalizing identity theft on social media. In 2010, New York became the first 
state to amend its penal code to include criminal liability for misappropriating another’s identity 
online. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinny 2008) (“A person is guilty of criminal 
impersonation in the second degree when he . . . [i]mpersonates another by communication by 
internet website or electronic means with intent to obtain a benefit or injure or defraud 
another . . . .”). Shortly thereafter, California adopted criminal liability for Internet 
impersonation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a), (d) (West 2011) (“[A]ny person who knowingly 
and without consent credibly impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web 
site or by other electronic means . . .” commits an offense that can be punished “by a fine not 
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one 
year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.”). In 2011, the Texas legislature followed suit. 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07(a) (West 2011) (mandating that a person commits an offense if 
they “. . . (1) create a web page on a commercial social networking site or other Internet 
website; or (2) post or send one or more messages on or through a commercial social 
networking site or other Internet website . . .” with the intent to defraud). The Texas statute 
went a step further in laying out the actions taken by wrongdoers that may create liability, 
which include creating a web page without the person’s consent and posting or sending 
messages on a site in order to impersonate another without their consent. Id. 
 114. See Draker v. Schrieber, 271 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App. 2008). In Draker, student-
defendants created a fake user profile on social media, claiming to be Draker, and uploaded 
sexually explicit commentary to the account. Id. at 320. Attempting to circumvent immunity 
granted by the CFAA, Draker sued claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. The 
court, however, found that Draker could not establish all of the elements and affirmed the trial 
court’s order granting the students’ motion for summary judgment. Id.  
 115. Id. at 326 (Stone, J., concurring) (“[T]here is, in fact, no remedy for their damages.”). 
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real names and contact information of anonymous users.
116
 If social 
media management is unwilling to voluntarily disclose users’ 
information, as most websites’ policies suggest,117 victims will often 
seek court subpoenas for companies to provide personal information 
of the alleged tortfeasor.
118
  
D. New Technology that Triggers Liability: Emojis 
A third nuanced issue social media defamation presents is 
interpreting the meaning of new forms of written communication 
available on technology. For example, in AvePoint, Inc. v. Power 
Tools, Inc.
119
 a U.S. court imposed liability for defamation based on a 
hashtag for the first time.
120
 A similar character denoting emotion on 
social media is an emoji.
121
 The U.S. judiciary has not yet seen a case 
to determine whether an emoji, like a hashtag, may impose 
liability.
122
  
Although unprecedented in the United States, a British court has 
held that an emoji can trigger liability for defamation on social 
media. In 2013, in McAlpine v. Bercow,
123
 a British court heard a case 
between prominent politician Lord McAlpine and popular political 
figure Sally Bercow.
124
 The controversy began in 2012, when the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that one of the 
 
 116. See generally Elkin, supra note 32, at 24 (describing how social media websites are 
often involved in defamation litigation despite not being named as defendants). 
 117. See id. (explaining that most website policies state that the website will not distribute 
users’ personal information unless required by law). 
 118. See id. (noting the utility of subpoenas in social media defamation cases). 
 119. AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496 (W.D. Va. 2013) (finding a 
Twitter user liable for posting a tweet that defamed a competing business’ reputation). 
 120. Id. See also Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53; Steven P. Mandell & Catherine L. 
Gibbons, Recent Developments in Media, Privacy, and Defamation Law, 50 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 515, 529 (2015). 
 121. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.  
 122. In September 2016, however, emojis included in a Facebook post led to probation in 
Illinois. See Emojis Taken as Threat Against Officer Lead to Probation for Peoria Man, CHI. 
TRIB. (Sept. 17, 2016, 6:24 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ breaking/ct-
emojis-threat-peoria-20160917-story.html (“A Peoria man pleaded guilty to threatening a police 
officer based on the emojis he included in a Facebook post has been sentenced to more than two 
years of probation.”). 
 123. McAlpine v. Bercow [2013] EWHC (QB) 1342. 
 124. Id. 
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abusers in a recently publicized child sex abuse case was “a leading 
Conservative politician from the Thatcher years . . . .”125 The BBC 
did not explicitly name Lord McAlpine,
126
 but individuals who heard 
the report quickly linked him to the allegations.
127
 Many took to 
social media and let their assumptions go viral, posting tweets on 
Twitter and statuses on Facebook connecting Lord McAlpine to the 
alleged sexual abuse.
128
 Sally Bercow
129
 took part and tweeted “Why 
is Lord McAlpine trending? *Innocent face*[.]”130  
At the time of her tweet, Bercow had over fifty-six thousand 
followers.
131
 Many of her followers re-tweeted
132
 the tweet, vastly 
expanding the number of individuals who read the statement.
133
 
Media sources later determined that the allegations against Lord 
McAlpine were unfounded.
134
 Having already suffered damage to his 
reputation, Lord McAlpine threated to sue the BBC and any Twitter 
user who insinuated he was a pedophile in their tweets—including 
Bercow.
135
 Lord McAlpine’s threats led to numerous settlements, but 
Bercow refused to settle.
136
 She denied any wrongdoing and refuted 
the idea that her tweet was libelous.
137
 Bercow even went so far as to 
 
 125. Id. [15]. 
 126. Lord McAlpine may be most well-known for his counsel to Margaret Thatcher during 
her reign as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Id. [17]. 
 127. Id. [71], [83].  
 128. See Keir Simmons, BBC Scandal: Wronged Ex-Politician Vows to Sue Twitter Users 
Who Spread Sex Claims, NBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://worldnews.nbcnews. 
com/news/2012/11/16/15216344-bbc-scandal-wronged-ex-politician-vows-to-sue-twitter-users-
who-spread-sex-claims (noting the “very long list” of users who posted comments linking Lord 
McAlpine to the crime). 
 129. Sally Bercow is the wife of Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow. In 
England, she lives in the public spotlight and, as a popular political figure, often serves as the 
topic of discussion in general media. Id. [10]. 
 130. Id. [3], [7] (noting “that the words ‘innocent face’ are to be read like . . . [an emoji].”). 
 131. Id. [10]. 
 132. See The Twitter Glossary, supra note 12 (“Retweet (v.)[:] The act of sharing another 
user’s Tweet to all of your followers . . . .”). 
 133. McAlpine, EWHC 1342 (QB) at [59]. 
 134. Bercow in Court for McAlpine Case, BRAINTREE & WITHAM TIMES (May 15, 2013), 
http://www.braintreeandwithamtimes.co.uk/uk_national_news/10422917.Bercow_in_court_for
_McAlpine_case/.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. Notably, Lord McAlpine donated the damages received from his settlements to 
charity. Id. 
 137. Simmons, supra note 128 (listing a tweet Bercow wrote that stated her initial tweet 
was not libelous). Although numerous other “high-profile Tweeters,” such as comedian Alan 
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mock Lord McAlpine, posting follow-up tweets maintaining her 
innocence.
138
  
Despite Bercow’s confidence, Lord McAlpine filed suit against 
her, alleging defamation. Lord McAlpine had two theories supporting 
his claim: (1) in its natural and ordinary meaning, the tweet meant he 
was a pedophile; and (2) the tweet by innuendo meant he was a 
pedophile.
139
  
At the preliminary hearing, the court found that Bercow intended 
the innocent face emoji to be ironic.
140
 The court interpreted the 
emoji as a “stage direction,”141 meaning that readers were directed to 
picture the publisher’s (Bercow’s) face as innocent when posing the 
question. The reasonable Twitter user—the standard adjudicated by 
the court—would have interpreted the emoji as ironic and asking an 
insincere question.
142
 Thus, the tweet was reasonably understood to 
be “the finger of blame[,]”143 accusing Lord McAlpine of being the 
pedophile that recent media news was discussing.
144
 Since by then the 
allegations linking Lord McAlpine to the sexual abuse were proven to 
be untrue, the court found that Bercow’s tweet was defamatory.145 
After the court found Bercow liable, she finally agreed to admit fault 
 
Davies and writer George Monbiot, tweeted allegedly defamatory remarks implicating Lord 
McAlpine in sex abuse claims, these individuals apologized to Lord McAlpine publicly and 
privately, and some agreed to do charity work. Ben Dowell, McAlpine Libel: 20 Tweeters 
Including Sally Bercow Pursued for Damages, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2012, 10:08 EST), 
http://www.theguardian.com/ tv-and-radio/2012/nov/23/mcalpine-libel-bercow-monbiot-davies. 
 138. One tweet read: “I guess I’d better get some legal advice then. Still maintain was not a 
libelous [sic.] tweet—just foolish.” Simmons, supra note 137. Another read: “Now counting 
coins in piggy bank coz Lord McAlpine will probably sue my a**.” Steve Nolan & Sam 
Greenhill, Speaker’s Wife Sally ‘to Be Sued by Lord McAlpine’ over Tweet that Fed Paedophile 
[sic.] Frenzy (So Why Won’t She Stop Twittering?), DAILY MAIL (Nov. 11, 2012, 9:09 EST), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2231288/Lord-McAlpine-sue-Sally-Bercow-pointing-
finger-Newsnight-investigation.html. 
 139. See McAlpine v. Bercow [2013] EWHC (QB) 1342, [33]. 
 140. Id. [84]. 
 141. Id. [7]. 
 142. Id. [57], [84]. 
 143. Id. [72]. 
 144. Id. [7]. 
 145. Id. [90]. 
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and settle the case.
146
 In the end, the emoji cost her over twenty 
thousand dollars.
147
 
McAlpine signifies the growing influence of social media in the 
context of defamation claims worldwide. Even with different legal 
doctrines for defamation between England and the United States,
148
 
McAlpine shows that social media users need to be more cautious 
with their online publications. Legal scholars who address McAlpine 
portray the case as a cautionary tale,
149
 but few use the case to 
directly ask whether an emoji could trigger liability under U.S. 
defamation law—and perhaps none take that question seriously.150 
In one article, Matthew Kelley and Steven Zansberg address 
McAlpine but provide a limited analysis of U.S. courts that have held 
Twitter users liable based on an emoji.
151
 Kelly and Zansberg begin 
discussing McAlpine with a sweeping disclaimer, stating: “[A] case 
with the same facts should be dismissed under U.S. law . . . .”152 The 
authors support this proposition with a brief footnote, listing U.S. 
 
 146. Kunal Dutta, Lord McAlpine Libel Row with Sally Bercow Settled in High Court, 
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/lord-mcalpine-
libel-row-with-sally-bercow-settled-in-high-court-8896773.html. 
 147. Bercow settled for fifteen thousand pounds, equivalent to over twenty-three thousand 
five hundred dollars. Dutta, supra note 146. Notably, this figure most likely does not tell the 
whole story. Throughout the controversy, Bercow likely also suffered emotional stress, public 
humiliation, and loss of reputation. She also likely paid sizable attorney and court fees in 
connection with the litigation and settlement negotiations. Thus, in reality, the emoji probably 
cost her much more than one lump sum.  
 148. The primary difference between England and the United States in analyzing 
defamation claims is the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Unlike the United States, 
England does not have an explicit right to free speech. Without a defined right to free speech, 
victims of defamation in England are much more likely to succeed in litigation. Victims of 
defamation over social media under U.S. law, however, have higher standards to overcome and 
are therefore less likely to succeed in court. See generally GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFERY H. 
MATSUURA, § 11.04 DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET AROUND THE WORLD (Aspen 
Publishers, 3d ed. 2013) (discussing different analyses applied for online defamation 
throughout the world). 
 149. See Zia Akhtar, Social Networking, Libel and Legal Liability, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 7 
(2014) (claiming that McAlpine in the English context “presents a risk of using applications 
such as [emojis] and such devices displayed over the Internet to reveal the state of mind or 
intention behind a [T]weet.”).  
 150. See Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53 (mentioning McAlpine briefly, but failing to 
critically analyze its implications under U.S. law). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 36.  
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cases that hold a published question never attaches liability.
153
 
Although Kelly and Zansberg’s analysis addresses McAlphine more 
than other scholars’ work, which overlook McAlphine entirely, the 
main takeaway is the same: McAlpine presents a cautionary tale 
imploring users to be more careful on social media.
154
  
III. ANALYSIS  
The rise of social media has left courts playing catch-up when 
attempting to remedy social media offenses. The context of 
defamation showcases how social media has largely adapted to 
existing law. This context also provides a lens through which to 
understand the nuanced issues social media presents in otherwise 
traditional defamation claims. Courts have had to determine whether 
statements published on social media are factual, who is liable as 
publisher under a claim, and which new technological characters may 
trigger liability.
155
 Taken together, these nuanced issues may soon 
lead to unlimited liability for individual social media users. The legal 
field must understand these nuances of social media defamation in 
order to begin to repair the potentially grave effects upon social 
media, the Internet, and the global community. 
Traditional defamation claims provide a suitable lens through 
which to view social media offenses, yet scholars overlook severe 
negative implications developing from the evolution of social media 
law. For example, although scholars herald McAlpine as a cautionary 
tale of online defamation,
156
 no scholar seems to take their own 
advice. Seemingly only one legal work addresses whether a case like 
McAlpine could impose liability in the United States.
157
 This article 
dismisses the possibility that a tweet like Bercow’s—containing a 
question and an emoji—could trigger liability, citing U.S. case law to 
 
 153. Id. n.34. 
 154. Id. at 11 (“[T]he case should caution those who transmit communications overseas 
(i.e., anything posted on the Internet) that disparages foreign nationals.”). See also Akhtar, 
supra note 149, at 10 (using McAlpine as evidence to support the argument that “[t]he power of 
the malicious author in a society that now relies on electronic media as the medium of 
information cannot be underestimated.”).  
 155. See supra Part II. 
 156. See Akhtar, supra note 149; Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53. 
 157. Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53. 
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support the conclusion that U.S. courts do not recognize questions as 
defamatory statements.
158
 Such a limited analysis falls short. 
In McAlpine, the court explicitly refutes the notion that Bercow’s 
tweet was a sincere question.
159
 The court’s entire rationale was 
premised on finding that the emoji in the tweet was intended to be, 
and was in fact, interpreted by readers as ironic.
160
 Understanding the 
emoji to be a stage direction of irony led to the court’s understanding 
that the text within the tweet was not intended to be a question,
161
 
despite the structure of the sentence ending with a question mark. 
In understanding that the court did not interpret the tweet as a 
question, the cases Kelley and Zansberg rely on (holding that 
questions cannot be defamatory)
162
 do not apply. Instead, a proper 
analysis falls under the Milkovich test, a two-prong test to determine 
whether the statement is a fact or an opinion, satisfying the falsity 
element of defamation.
163
 Under this proper analysis, McAlpine is 
analogous to AvePoint.
164
 
In AvePoint, the court found liability based on a defamatory tweet 
that contained hashtags.
165
 The court reasoned that the hashtag, 
“#MadeinCHINA,”166 implied that the plaintiff’s products were not 
made in America but in China. Acknowledging that customers would 
likely be reluctant to purchase the plaintiff’s products if made in 
China, the court found that a reasonable reader would have 
interpreted the hashtag to be a factual statement.
167
 Since the factual 
statement was then proven false, the defendant was liable to the 
plaintiff for defamation.
168
 
 
 158. Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53. 
 159. McAlpine v. Bercow, [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 53. 
 163. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 25 (1990) (holding for a statement to 
be actionable under defamation, it must be (1) “provable as false,” and (2) “reasonably be 
interpreted as stating actual facts”). 
 164. AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496 (W.D. Va. 2013) (holding 
defendant liable for a defamatory tweet). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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Under the court’s rationale in AvePoint, an emoji within a tweet 
may trigger liability under U.S. law. Considering the facts of 
McAlpine and setting aside the standard of actual malice under U.S. 
law,
169
 a court may interpret the emoji in McAlpine similar to how the 
court in AvePoint interpreted the hashtag. As AvePoint allowed a 
hashtag as a new form of electronic communication to signal an 
implication of fact,
170
 so too might a court allow an emoji—another 
new form of electronic communication—to signal an implication of 
fact. Considering Bercow’s tweet, a U.S. court plausibly could find 
that the emoji signaled Bercow knew why Lord McAlpine was 
trending; thus, the tweet factually implied that Lord McAlpine was 
the pedophile. 
Admittedly, this logic may reach beyond existing case law, but 
therein lies the fundamental problem. Individual users of social media 
do not know what may trigger liability. Bercow did not know, and it 
is unlikely that the two billion social media users consider whether an 
emoji may impose liability before each post. Courts are failing to 
provide notice of potential liability to billions of people because the 
judiciary is merely reacting to new electronic communications.  
Emojis triggering liability for defamation on social media should 
concern the ordinary social media user. The only proactive measures 
taken in the context of social media law is immunizing social media 
providers, as seen in the CDA. These immunities—which courts are 
only expanding upon—do not prevent harms, mitigate offenses, or 
provide remedies. Instead, statutes like the CDA attempt to take 
social media websites out of the picture. When an offense occurs and 
the victim seeks recourse, the victim is only able to pursue the 
individual user who authored the statement. At first, this scenario 
may seem fair—individuals should be responsible for their own 
publications. But considering this new universe of technology, social 
media, and emojis, and realizing how ordinary users are unaware of 
 
 169. Under U.S. defamation law, Lord McAlpine would have had to meet the standard of 
“actual malice” because he is a public official. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 
(1964). Thus, it would have been much more difficult for Lord McAlpine to succeed in U.S. 
courts. Id. This analysis, however, is outside the scope of this Note. The Note analyzes 
Bercow’s tweet under U.S. law to determine whether an emoji may impose liability, regardless 
of standards of actual malice or negligence.  
 170. AvePoint, 981 F. Supp. 2d 496. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol52/iss1/15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  The Emoji that Cost $20,000 251 
 
 
the potential for liability, the scheme enacted under the CDA is 
flawed. Congress’ proactive measures to immunize social media 
websites, which has led to courts’ reactive measures holding 
individuals liable, has collectively hung two billion social media 
users out to dry.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
The legal profession—especially social media law scholars—must 
view the outcome of McAlpine as a warning sign. McAlpine was a 
case of a Twitter user (Bercow) posting an off-handed remark about a 
trending scandal.
171
 When Lord McAlpine began mentioning 
defamation, Bercow paid no mind. Even when Lord McAlpine settled 
claims with other Twitter users and discussed litigation against 
Bercow, she was so unaware of the potential for liability that she 
encouraged litigation.
172
 
Bercow’s mocking behavior likely came from her confidence in 
knowing that she did not intend the statement to be defamatory. Such 
behavior also illustrates a complete lack of awareness that an emoji, 
even one depicting innocence, could trigger liability for over twenty 
thousand dollars. As Bercow immediately settled the case after the 
preliminary hearing’s ruling in favor of Lord McAlpine,173 it is likely 
she would have apologized sooner and perhaps not even posted the 
tweet had she had any idea it could trigger liability in court. 
In addition to the proposal for legal academics, Congress must 
enact new federal legislation that comprehensively addresses social 
media offenses. Bercow’s story illustrates the flaws of a reactive 
judiciary in an era of growing social media. Bercow had no notice 
and no reason to assume that an emoji she posted in a tweet could 
trigger liability for defamation. Narrating Bercow’s story in this light 
emphasizes a main issue in our social media law and forces us to seek 
better solutions.
174
  
 
 171. McAlpine v. Bercow, [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB). 
 172. Id. (referencing Bercow’s later tweet taunting Lord McAlpine by encouraging him to 
sue her). See also supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 173. Dutta, supra note 147. 
 174. The evolution of social media law parallels the development of privacy law beginning 
in the late nineteenth century, and further supports the proposal for new federal legislation. The 
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First, new legislation must enact a policy that focuses on holding 
Internet content providers, which include social media websites like 
Facebook and Twitter, responsible for social media offenses. In 
providing the platforms through which users are susceptible to 
liability, and profiting from the free flow of information, social media 
websites should bear responsibility for harms perpetrated on their 
websites.  
Second, new legislation must require social media content 
providers to notify users of potential liability and provide models on 
how to avoid liability on their websites. At a minimum, new federal 
legislation must require Internet content providers to properly notify 
users of the potential for liability. Such notification cannot amount to 
boilerplate terms of agreement when first creating an account, as 
many already have. Instead, notification should be updated frequently 
to account for new electronic characters and explain to each user 
existing claims and potential claims for liability resulting from social 
media offenses under the law. In addition, such notifications should 
include models illustrating to users how to avoid and prevent harms 
online.  
Third, new legislation must impose a penalty scheme for failing to 
provide adequate notice. Failure to provide proper and current notice 
should lead to fines imposed by the government. If a website 
continuously fails to notify users in an appropriate manner and shows 
 
legal field first recognized a need for privacy law with the advancement of technology, 
specifically yellow journalism and penny presses. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31. 
Similar to social media, penny presses made information easily available to the masses. It 
drastically altered daily life in the nineteenth century and gave rise to new forms of defamation 
in the legal context. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31. Privacy law eventually developed into 
four distinct tort claims: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts, 
(3) false light, and (4) appropriation. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 
(1960); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND 
TECHNOLOGY 28 (3d ed. 2011). These four claims developed outside of then-existing tort law, 
exactly how social media claims have developed outside of traditional defamation claims. 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 197–98. Prominent scholars have argued these four 
categories of privacy are too narrow, and thus the judiciary’s acceptance of them has stunted 
privacy law and remedial measures. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s 
Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887 (2010). The parallels between privacy 
torts and social media torts, and the inadequacies of privacy law that exist today, supports the 
proposal of new legislation, as social media law cannot be limited to existing common law 
claims.  
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no signs of compliance, the government ought to have the authority 
to dismantle the site.  
Fourth, the new legislation should mandate that social media 
websites are listed as defendants if a defamation claim arising from 
its website is brought in court. Including social media websites as 
defendants would allow courts to determine on a proportionality 
scheme the amount the user and the social media website are liable. 
Instead of placing all responsibility on one person, the mandate 
would force courts to include social media websites within the 
discussion. It would allow courts to actually consider the totality of 
the circumstances—which exist beyond one user and one computer. 
And, it would allow courts to award victims of social media 
defamation more appropriate remedies, regardless of a liable author’s 
potentially limited means. This mandate would also incentivize social 
media websites to actively prevent offenses on their sites. It would 
not only ensure compliance with notification requirements, but also 
encourage websites to implement their own systems to deter harm.  
Such new legislation could have many benefits. For one, it would 
bring social media websites into the conversation regarding online 
defamation, as they should have been from the start. Also, the penalty 
scheme and mandate requiring social media providers be listed as 
defendants in litigation would incentivize Internet content providers 
not only to notify users of potential liability but also to actively 
prevent social media harms. The legislation would further deter harm 
when individual users are notified of potential liability. Thus, new 
legislation is a reasonable, necessary, and important step in 
establishing an enduring framework that protects social media users 
while allowing for the continued advancement of Internet 
communication. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To mitigate, deter, and/or prevent social media defamation, the 
legislature must better include and focus on Internet content 
providers. Considering the implications of litigation developing from 
social media offenses and how, currently, individual users are the 
main parties held liable, requiring Internet content providers to better 
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notify users of liability arising from social media and requiring them 
to participate in litigation is the only practical solution. 
As Sally Bercow best articulated in a tweet following her 
settlement with Lord McAlpine: “I have apologized sincerely to Lord 
McAlpine in court—I hope others have learned tweeting can inflict 
real harm on people’s lives.”175 The goals of new legislation are to 
have social media websites teach users that online engagement can 
inflict harm on others, and to prevent cases—like McAlpine—where 
users have to learn the lesson themselves. 
 
 175. Sally Bercow (@SallyBercow), TWITTER (Oct. 22, 2013, 4:07 AM GMT), 
https://twitter.com/sallybercow/status/392608216393064448. 
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